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et al.: Recent Decisions

RECENT DECISIONS
CRIMINAL LAW-Use of illegally obtained confession by the
prosecution to impeach the credibility of a defendant who testifies in his own behalf. People v. Kulis (N.Y. 1966); State v.
Brewton (Ore. 1967).
Before the defendant in the former case was arrested or subjected to any restraint by the police, he made admissions and
exhibited physical conditions in his apartment which tended
to connect him with a murder then being investigated. On his
arrest the defendant requested that he be allowed to see a lawyer. This request was not promptly granted by the police and
before a lawyer reached him, a statement was taken from the
defendant by an assistant district attorney. On direct testimony
in his own behalf, the defendant denied any complicity in the
murder, but the prosecutor was allowed to introduce the inadmissible confession to impeach his credibility as a witness. The
defendant was convicted and the Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, affirmed. On appeal to the Court of Appeals of New
York, held, affirmed. Although the statement would not have
been admissible as part of the People's direct case under Escobedo v. Illinois,1 it was admissible on the question of the defendant's credibility as a witness. People v. Kulis, 18 N.Y.2d 318,
221 N.E.2d 541, 274 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1966). (5-to-2).
In the latter case the defendant made statements elicited by
police interrogation without the warnings and advice concerning
fifth and sixth amendment protection now required. The State
conceded that the statements were inadmissible as part of its
case in chief. When the defendant took the stand in his own
defense and told a story which was inconsistent with his previous statements, however, the state offered his police station
admissions for the limited purposes of impeachment, and they
were so received over a timely objection. The defendant was
convicted, and on appeal the Supreme Court of Oregon, held,
reversed and remanded. The statements elicited from a defendant by police interrogation which were inadmissible as part of
the prosecution's case in chief because of failure to comply with
constitutional requirements could not be used to impeach the
defendant as a witness even though such statements were volun1. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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tarily made. State v. Brewton, 422 P.2d 581 (Ore. 1967).

(4-to-3).
The opinion in Kulis states that the basis of distinction between the admissibility of wrongfully obtained evidence in the
direct case of the prosecution and its use to impeach the credibility of the defendant as a witness is demonstrated in the
2
opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Walder 'v. United States.
In Brewton the dissent of Justice Perry follows the same reasoning. There was also vague reference to lVaider in Judge Keating's dissent in Kulis which argues only on the basis of exclusion
and inadmissibility as determined in Escobedo v. Illinoiss and
Miranda v. Arizona4 and fails to attack the majority reliance
on Walder. Justice Goodwin's majority opinion in Brewton
likewise ignores Valder and dwells on the constitutional questions answered in Miranda. There was no need, however, for
either court to point to any exclusionary rule since both prosecutors, apparently realizing that the statements were obtained
without the constitutional protections, did not attempt to use the
statements in their cases in chief. It further appears that those
who rely on Valder have failed to make a close examination of
this case, and Judge Keating's vague reference in Kulis to the
rule of Walder did a disservice to the strength of his dissent.
The most effective and frequently employed attack upon the
credibility of a witness is by proving that he, on a previous
occasion, has made statements inconsistent with his present
testimony.5 The sanction of this tactic by the courts appears
firm: illegally obtained evidence may be used to challenge
the truth and reliability of a defendant's assertions collateral
to the issue of guilt if the defendant takes the stand and if
his testimony is at variance with such statements.6 In United
States v. Curry7 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
recognized that the prosecution cannot use the fruits of an illegal
action to establish elements of the crime with which the defendant is charged. The court, however, acknowledged that if the
defendant offers testimony contrary to the facts disclosed by the
2. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
3. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1017-1046 (3d ed. 1940); Hale, Prior InconREv. 135 (1937).

sistent Statements, 10 So. CAL L.

6. United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904, 909 (2d Cir. 1966) citing Walder
v. United States.

7. 358 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1966).
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evidence, the prosecution may, in the interest of truth, use the
illegally obtained evidence to establish facts collateral to the
ultimate issue of guilt. This is the doctrine of Walder v. United
States.8
Thus, Kulis and Brewton may be distinguished from lValder,
for in Walder the defendant made sweeping claims that went
beyond a mere denial of complicity in the crimes for which he
was charged. The defendant was charged with conspiring to
sell narcotics and admitted receiving packages, the contents of
which were unknown to him. On cross-examination he stated
that he had never seen narcotics. The prosecution was allowed
to impeach this defendant's credibility as a witness by introducing evidence of an unconnected seizure of narcotics in his possession two years previous, which seizure was illegal under the
fourth amendment.9
The Supreme Court in lValder contrasted that case with
Agnello v. United States' ° in which the prosecution, after having failed in its efforts to introduce the tainted evidence in its
case in chief, tried to smuggle it in on cross-examination by
asking the accused the broad question, "Did you ever see narcotics before?" After eliciting the expected denial, the prosecution sought to introduce evidence of narcotics located in the
defendant's home by means of an unlawful search and seizure
in order to discredit the defendant's credibility as a witness.
The Court in Agnello said, "[T]he contention that the evidence
of the search and seizure was admissible in rebuttal is without
merit . .

.

. [Agnello] did nothing to waive his constitutional

protection or to justify cross-examination in respect of [sic] the
evidence claimed to have been obtained by the search."'"
In Kulis and in Brewton the respective defendants did not
of their own accord exceed the bounds of testimony necessary
to their defense by making sweeping claims. They can offer
their own version of the events charged in the indictment. Moreover, the evidence used to impeach their credibility as witnesses
was in the nature of a confession of the very charge on trial.
This raises a clear likelihood of prejudice not present when, as
in Walder, the impeaching evidence is unrelated to the indictment. Thus, Walder does not allow the testimony regarding
8. 347 U.s. 62 (1954).
9. Ibid.
10. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).

11. Id. at 35.
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Kulis' confession or Brewton's statements. "[T he Government
could do no more work in this evidence
on cross-examination
12
than it could on its case in chief.
In Johnson v. United States's the court stated that the general rule is that evidence which is inadmissible to prove the case
in chief is inadmissible for all purposes. The evidence is not
rendered admissible merely because the defendant testifies in
his own behalf. In Harrold v. Oklahoma'4 the court said, "The
privilege granted to an accused person of testifying in his own
behalf would be a poor and useless one indeed if he could exercise it only on condition that every incompetent confession ...
should become evidence against him."' 5
Justice Goodwin, speaking for the majority in Brewton sums
up the need for the Oregon ruling:
If we should today adopt a restrictive application of the
exclusionary rule, the result could be a major step backward.
This court would in effect be saying to the overzealous that
police officers will be free in the future to interrogate suspects secretly, at arms length, without counsel, and without
advice, so long as they use means consistent with threat-orpromise voluntariness, and so long as they understand that
they may file the information only for use to keep the defendant honest. Thus the police could, at their option, take
a calculated risk: By giving up the possibility of using the
suspect's statements in the state's case, they could obtain by
unconstitutional means and store away evidence to use if
the defendant should elect upon trial to take the stand. As
commendable as it may be to prevent perjury, the price of
such prevention could be to keep defendants off the stand
entirely. In some cases, the temptation to silence a suspect
of dubious probity might very well outweigh the desire to
conduct a constitutionally valid interrogation. We have concluded that to introduce such a rule could undo much of
the recent progress that has been made in upgrading police
methods to preserve the rights guaranteed under the Fifth
12. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 66 (1954) describing the holding in
Agnello v. United States.
13. 344 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
14. 169 Fed. 47 (8th Cir. 1909).
15. Id. at 50.
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be inconsistent with the
and Sixth Amendments, and would
18
decisions.
recent
trend of our
To permit the State of New York to introduce illegally obtained statements which bear directly on a defendant's guilt or
innocence in the name of "impeachment" would seriously jeopardize the important substantive policies and functions underlying the established exclusionary rules.
STANLy H. KoHIN

16. 422 P.2d 581, 583 (Ore. 1967).
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EMINENT DOMAIN- Water pollution-Under the laws of
South Carolina, a manufacturer has no vested right to discharge
industrial wastes into streams. United States v. 531.13 Acres of
Land (4th Cir. 1966).
As a result of the Hartwell Dam and Reservoir Project, a federal flood control venture on the Savannah River, the Seneca
River, a tributary of the Savannah, was reclassified by the South
1
Carolina Water Pollution Control Authority from class "C"
to a class "A" stream. The reason for the change was that the
new reservoir created by the Hartwell dam was to be partially
devoted to public fishing, swimming, and boating, and consequently required a higher degree of purity from its tributaries.
The effect on J. P. Stevens & Co. was that its plant on the banks
of the Seneca could no longer discharge its waste into that
stream without first running it through a disposal facility. Relying on another Fourth Circuit decision, Town of Clarksville v.
United States,2 Stevens insisted that since the need for the disposal facility had been precipitated by the government, the cost
for its construction should be borne by the United States as
part of compensation for property taken from Stevens under
the power of eminent domain. A commission appointed by consent reported the claims sustained and the United States District
Court for the Western District of South Carolina reached the
same conclusions on independent findings as well as in approval
of those made by the commission. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, held, reversed. An upper riparian
owner may discharge waste into a stream in South Carolina
only so long as this does not interfere with a reasonable use
being made of the stream by a lower riparian owner. The offensive use of the stream may be terminated either by an owner
through common law remedies or the state through the '"rater
Pollution Control Board. Neither amounts to a taking of property for which compensation must be paid. United States v.
531.13 Acres of Land, 366 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1966).
Before looking at this court's interpretation of South Carolina
law, it would be best to point out the manner and extent of
change indicated in the circuit court's attitude toward pollution
of rivers and riparian rights.
1. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 70-101 to -139 (1962) set up the agency, spelled out
the state's policy, and specifically authorized the classification of waters at

§ 70-112.

2. 198 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 927 (1953).
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In Town of Clarksville v. United States, noted above, the
government was also engaged in building a dam and creating a
sizeable backwater. The impounded waters were to inundate
approximately forty-one per cent of the town of Clarksville
and render useless its sewage system, which had previously
emptied directly into the stream to be dammed. The government
conceded to the town that it should pay for the construction of
a substitute facility. Arrangements were complicated, however,
when the State Water Control Board of Virginia announced
that the town's indefinite license to run sewage into the stream
was being revoked (as all parties admitted knowing it would
be sooner or later) and that a new system would have to include a sewage treatment facility before it would be approved.
The government was required to pay for the treatment facility
because, said the court, "We fail to see how it can logically be
argued that the Government's action did not fasten this obligation upon the Town. The duty to build the plant was not present
before the condemnation. .... ,,3
In answer to the government's argument that the necessity of
the treatment plant was brought about by state, not federal,
action and that such state action was bound to happen regardless,
the court said:
We do not agree with this interpretation. The Water
Control Board took no positive action until after the condemnation was started. The taking was at least operative as
both notice and spur to the Board to act. Moreover, it is
apparent that the Board's policy was not to modify or revoke existing licenses until a sewer system was substantially
changed. Certainly there is a strong inference that, without
such forced alteration by the Government, the Town could
have operated under its present license for many years, if
not indefinitely, without being required to build a treat4
ment plant.
Though necessarily abbreviated here, the similarity between
the facts of the two cases is striking. Here are two entities, a
factory and a town, whose waste disposal facilities are declared
improper by a state water pollution control agency whose action
is admittedly precipitated by federal condemnation and construction activities; both had land taken by the government, and
3. Town of Clarksville v. United States, 198 F.2d 238, 243 (4th Cir. 1952).
4. Ibid.
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both were required by the state agency to build a waste treatment
facility.
The court in 531.13 Acres of Land distinguished Clarksville
on the ground that in that case the government had already conceded its obligation to build a comparable sewage system for the
town, while in 531.13 Acres of Land no obligation had been conceded. "The only question there," said the court, "was the amount
of compensation; here liability for any amount at all is the
issue.""
The distinction is of doubtful validity. In both cases the problem was whether the government should pay for a waste treatment facility, the need for which it had brought about through
its dam-building projects.
In Clarksville the town and the government had stipulated
that just compensation should be in the form of a substitute
facility. The court said the issue was "what constitutes that
facility under conditions as they will exist when the flooding
becomes an accomplished fact."8 In other words, the government
and the town had stipulated that just compensation was to be
paid and the court decided that the question was what constituted just compensation-hardly a novel problem.
But in 531.13 Acres of Land, a new question was raised which
was not considered by the court in Clarksville,though the opportunity was certainly present. The issue presented in 531.13 Acres
of Land was whether a riparian owner has a compensable pioperty right to use a stream for waste disposal purposes. So the
issues are different indeed; not because of the facts, however,
but because the court has redefined the question. In so doing it
has indicated that the lenient attitude assumed toward the town
in Clarksville should no longer be relied upon.
Having dispensed with the Clarksville case, the court was free
to consider whether, under South Carolina law, the right to run
waste into a stream existed.
The right of all riparian owners to make reasonable use of
passing waters is a principle deeply embedded in the common
law of South Carolina.7 The reasonableness of the use, however,
has traditionally been tested by its effect on other landowners
5. United States v. 531.13 Acres of Land, 366 F.2d 915, 920 (4th Cir. 1966).
6. Town of Clarksville v. United States, 198 F.2d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 1952).
7. E.g., Duncan v. Union-Buffalo Mills Co., 110 S.C. 302, 96 S.E. 522
(1918) ; Garrett v. McKie, 1 Rich. L. 444 (S.C. 1845) ; Ornelvany v. Jaggers,
2 Hill L. 634 (S.C. 1835).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol19/iss2/8

8

1967]

et al.: Recent Decisions
RECENT DECISIONS

along the stream. As early as 1835 the Supreme Court of South
Carolina approved the following statement of this rule:
[T]he possessor of lands through which a natural stream
runs, has a right to the advantage of the stream flowing in
its natural course, and to use it as he pleases, and for any
purposes of his own not inconsistent with a similar right of
the proprietors of the land abovve amd below....8
Directly in point and supporting the court's position is a jury
instruction approved by the court in Duncan v. Union-Buffalo
Mills Co.:
Owners of land on the banks of a stream are entitled to
the reasonable use of the stream; that they can use the
stream for their own purposes to a reasonable extent; that
while it is true that a stream must not be polluted, still this
does not mean that nothing can be put into the stream; but
that nothing can be put therein that will deprive the landowners below to the reasonable use of the stream.9
Undeniably, the rule is that if a use of a stream interferes
with another's reasonable use thereof, the interfering use is
unreasonable and will support a cause of action by the injured
landowner. Further, it is equally undeniable that the Water
Pollution Control Authority may exercise its power to terminate
unreasonable pollution of streams where the interest of the public is threatened. 10 It follows, a fortiori, that no riparian owner
has a compensable right to interfere with a lower riparian owner's reasonable use of the land.
The court, through the age-old legerdemain of "distinguishing
the issues," has avoided overruling its decision in Town of
Clarksville v. United States but has all but destroyed its usefulness as a precedent for the scores of cases which are sure to arise
in this area.
J. SPrArr WnITE, IV

8. Omelvany v. Jaggers, supra note 7, at 638-39 (emphasis added).
9. 110 S.C. 302, 306, 96 S.E. 522, 524 (1917) (emphasis added).
10. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 70-101 to -139 (1962).
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The Commissioner's

"overnight" or "sleep or rest" rules have no rational relation to
the business necessity of the meal expense. Correll v. United
States (6th Cir. 1966).
The taxpayer, a grocery salesman, sold his merchandise to
restaurants in various cities. In order to be in his territory at the
beginning of the day he had to arise at 4:30 in the morning.
He was required by his employer to eat his breakfast and lunch
at customers' restaurants, where he could be reached by telephone. He traveled 150 to 175 miles daily, returning home about
5:30 in the afternoon. The taxpayer's employer reimbursed him
for meal expenses. The taxpayer deducted costs of his meals as
business expenses incurred "while away from home."' The Commissioner disallowed the deduction and assessed a deficiency
on the ground that the cost of meals was not deductible unless
the duration of the travel was so extensive as to require the taxpayer to obtain sleep or rest. The taxpayer paid the deficiency,
applied for a refund, and upon its denial, sued in the District
Court.2 A jury verdict was returned in favor of the taxpayer
for the full refund, plus interest. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, held, affirmed. The Commissioner's "overnight" or "sleep or rest" rules bear no rational
relation to the business necessity of the meal expenses. Correll V.
United States, 369 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1966).
Traveling expenses fall into two categories: (1) traveling
expenses while away from home and (2) other traveling expenses
such as transportation expenses in the local area. Where the
travel is away from home, the cost of meals and lodging may be
deducted in addition to the transportation expenses, such as
railroad and taxicab fares. 3 The cost of traveling from one's
1. INT. REV. CODE of 1954,

§ 162(a)(2). The relevant part of the Code

reads as follows:
(a) In General-There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordi-

nary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year
in carrying on any trade or business including....
(2) traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals and
lodging . . . ) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or
business ....
2. Correll v. United States, 65-1 CCH U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9337 (E.D. Tenn.
1965).
3. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 162(a) (2) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(a) (1958);
with regard to an employee's duty to account for reimbursed travel expenses
see Treas. Reg. § 1.162-17 (1958).
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home to his place of business, i.e., commuting expense, is not
deductible.

4

The short phrase "away from home" has spawned a long line
of cases which have attempted to clarify its meaning. 5 This
phrase made its first appearance in the Revenue Act of 1921
which provided that the entire amount expended for meals and
lodging while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business could be deducted as travel expenses.0 This provision was
included without alteration in section 23(a) (1) of the 1939
CodeJ and was carried over verbatim in the 1954 Code as section
162(a) (2).8

Nothing in the legislative history of section 214(a) (2) of
the Revenue Act of 1921 [now section 162(a) (2) of the 1954
Code] lends support to any contention that the words "while
away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business" were
intended to have a special significance over and above the ordinary import of the language. It should be particularly noted
that there is no language in the statute limiting its application
to the expenses incurred while away from home overnight.
Indeed, it was not until 1958 that regulations were adopted
9
which mentioned for the first time the word "overnight."
This overnight rule has been repeatedly questioned and limited.10 However, the Commissioner in Correll and in earlier
cases". took the position that being away from home "overnight"
is a prerequisite to travel status, and expenses incurred for meals
while not away from home "overnight" are personal expenses
4. Expenses of going to work by car or any other method, even in emer-

gencies, are not deductible.

Lenke Marot, 36 T.C. 23

(1961).

But see

Rice v. Riddell, 179 F. Supp. 576 (S.D. Cal. 1959) holding that a casual
musician who played the tuba and bass at various locations could deduct car
expenses in traveling to these locations.
5. For a discussion of other problems that arise while "away from home"
see generally Haddleton, Traveling Expenses "Away From Home", 17 TAX

L. REv. 261 (1962); Note, Travel Expense Deductions, 43 VA. L. REv. 59
(1957).
6. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 214(a) (1), 42 Stat. 239.
7. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 23(a) (1), 53 Stat. 12.
8. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 162(a) (2).
9. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-17(b) (3) (ii), 1.162-17(b) (4) and 1.162-17(c) (2)
(1958).
10. Most previous cases rejecting the overnight rule dealt only with transportation expenses. Chandler v. Commissioner, 226 F2d 467 (1st Cir. 1955) ;
Scott v. Kelm, 110 F. Supp. 819 (D. Minn. 1953); Horace E. Podems, 24
T.C. 21 (1955); Kenneth Waters, 12 T.C. 414 (1949).
11. Cases cited note 10 supra; see also Al J. Smith, 33 T.C. 861 (1960);
Fred Marion Osteen, 14 T.C. 1261 (1950).
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which do not come under section 162(a) (2) of the Internal
Revenue Code.
However, as the Correll case illustrates, the future of the
"overnight" rule seems dim. The Tax Court has drastically
14
8
modified it,12 and the Courts of Appeal for the First, Fifth,
15
Sixth and Eighth' Circuits have flatly rejected it.
Although earlier Tax Court decisions strictly construed the
Commissioner's rulings, 17 the recent case of Bagley v. Commissioner'" took a more liberal view. In that case the court allowed
a consulting engineer a deduction for meals purchased on nonovernight trips to work sites. In so ruling, the court stated that
it had discarded the "overnight" rule as an absolute standard
and will decide future cases on their individual facts.
0 a railroad
In Williams v. Patterson,'
conductor who lived
in Montgomery, Alabama, had a six-hour layover in Atlanta,
Georgia. He rented a hotel room near the station in order that
he might sleep before the return trip home. There was no requirement that he do this. He also ate lunch and dinner in
Atlanta. His deduction for meals and lodging in Atlanta was
approved. The court stated:
The 'overnight' gloss was dreamed up by the Depart[T]here is nothing in the statute indicating any
congressional intent that 'away from home' means either
overnight or away from home for a period substantially
longer than an ordinary working day, or that it means 'a
trip on which the taxpayer's duties [in his released time]
required him to obtain necessary sleep away from his home
20
terminal.'
ment ....

12, Bagley v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 176 (1966).
13. Chandler v. Commissioner, 226 F2d 467 (1st Cir. 1955). As this issue
went to press, the First Circuit reversed its former position by accepting the
"overnight" rule in Commission v. Bagley, 67-1 CCH U.S. Tax. Cas.

11-50 (1st Cir. 1967).

14. Williams v. Patterson, 286 F2d 333 (5th Cir. 1961).
15. Correll v. United States, 369 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1966).
16. United States v. Morelan, 356 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966).
17. In Fred Marion Osteen, 14 T.C. 1261 (1950), a deduction for meals was
denied a railway postal clerk who had a six hour and twenty minute round
trip and ate a meal while at his destination. The Court reasoned that the taxpayer was in "no essentially different position from the worker who is unable
to have one of his meals at home." See also Sam J. Herrin, 28 T.C. 1303

(1957).

18. 46 T.C. 176 (1966).
19. 286 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1961).
20. Id. at 335.
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Shortly after the Fifth Circuit rejected the "overnight" rule
in Willa ms, the Eighth Circuit followed suit in Hanson v. Commissioner,2 1 stating that the only test authorized by the statute
was whether the taxpayer was "away from home. '22 In United
States 'v. Morelan23 the Eighth Circuit again refused to follow
the "overnight" rule. There, the State of Minnesota set up meal
schedules for highway patrolmen and directed that they eat only
in certain places so that they could be reached if necessary. The
court held that the subsistence allowance was not includible in
gross income since the meals were furnished on the business
premises primarily for the convenience of the employer. However, the court went on to state that even if includible in gross
income it would be deductible since, "[t]he appellees herein
clearly fall under § 162 as they were required to be and were
Caway from home' for certain meals while on patrol in any and
'2 4
all parts of their station areas.
The court in Comell, relying on Hanson, held that the plain
language of the statute means what it says and stated that any
change in the statute lies with Congress and not with the judiciary. The court stressed that in an era of supersonic travel the
use of a time element in testing deductibility is irrelevant.
The courts that refused to follow the "overnight" rule have
sacrificed the convenience of a "rule of thumb" for a more just
result. Unfortunately, it appears that the Internal Revenue
Service prefers the "rule of thumb" and will continue to use
the "overnight" rule as a test of being away from home. 25
Within the framework of section 162 (a) (2) the Correll decision is to be commended as a reasonable interpretation of the
statutory language and must be approved for entirely rejecting
the application of the "overnight" rule.

21. 298 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1962).
22. Id. at 397. "For tax purposes, the petitioner's home was Washington,
Iowa. Any travel on business away from the area of Washington, Iowa, was
travel away from home within the meaning of the statute, whether such travel
involved remaining overnight or not."
23. 356 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966).
24. 356 F.2d 199, 210 (8th Cir. 1966).

25. Rev. Rul. 63-239, 1963-2 Cum. BuLL. 87.
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